Townsend argues that Peirce and Hegel are closer than even Royce admits. So why does Royce side with Peirce? Of course, Peirce was not the only pragmatist offering voluntarist insights to Royce, so let us now turn to James. However, even more so than between Royce and Peirce, detailing all of the interactions between James and Royce is a monumental task. Fortunately, this task has been undertaken by scholars such as Clendenning, Oppenheim, Kegley, and Auxier, so I need not repeat all of it here. For Wundt, consciousness originates in sensation.
However, sensations are always already presented as representations that, if considered as representing external reality, are perceptions. Nonetheless, Royce and James are typically seen as philosophical opponents, despite this shared background. Why so? Royce rebuts with an Absolute Voluntarism and an Absolute Pragmatism. This is a primordial form of will, or conation more broadly, while the fuller concept of Will can only come after an account of docility, or our ability to learn; in particular, through imitation.
What of his Absolute Voluntarism? The topic has an entry of two full double-column pages written by James Hayden Tufts, who at this point had been developing the Chicago School of Pragmatism with Dewey, George Herbert Mead, and others, for almost a decade. Tufts, ; etymology omitted.
The early modern period is largely intellectualist, with Spinoza as the best representative and Leibniz as attempting a voluntarist correction. Royce does not merit a mention. First, Renouvier is mostly remembered for inspiring James to believe in free will.
Finally, Biran is at the beginning of a tradition of French Voluntarism, reaching into the thought of Henri Bergson, another key influence on James. However, L. For now, let us dwell a little more with some forgotten observers of the debates about pragmatism.
What seems to me to give the conflict between Pragmatism and Absolutism its real importance and significance is that it is but a phase in that wider conflict between Intellectualism and Voluntarism, the roots of which can be traced back to the reaction against the Hegelian Philosophy in Germany in the years This is preparation for a second article on Pragmatism as presented by James and Schiller, which we will focus on here.
Most significantly for our purposes:. I am bold enough to think that the doctrine of the development of a consciousness of self and a consciousnesses of the world, i. Or, as Royce refers to it repeatedly in this address, instrumentalism.
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That is, Royce sees the instrumentalism of Dewey, as well as the pragmatism of James, as inspired by a voluntarism he shares with both. And yet, this voluntarism is insufficient if understood as individualistic or relativistic:. For what we hereby learn is that all truth is indeed relative to the expression of our will, but that the will inevitably determines for itself forms of activity which are objectively valid and absolute, just because to attempt to inhibit these forms is once more to act, and is to act in accordance with them.
Finally, by identifying his Absolute Voluntarism with Absolute Pragmatism, Royce in effect declares himself and Peirce as the only real pragmatists. So what did Dewey say about absolute voluntarism? Second, and most significantly for us, Dewey denies that Royce is a pragmatist, on three grounds.
One, while pragmatism might be stated in psychological terms, and thereby be a kind of psychological voluntarism, it does not have to be stated so.
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Dewey is kinder in a address, in part because of minimizing the ill spoken of the dead, in part because of an apparent greater familiarity with the later Royce. Nonetheless, Dewey repeats his criticism that Royce solutions are unacceptable because they derive from problems wrongly stated.
As Dewey argues, solutions are relative to problems, and perhaps the problem of the relation between German Idealism and American Pragmatism is better recast as the contest between intellectualism and voluntarism. Of course, offering another opposed set of traditions may only amplify the complexity of the relationship between the traditions of idealism and pragmatism, but sometimes a thread that leads us through a labyrinth does so by showing us how convoluted the labyrinth is.
With Peirce, we saw both the well-known admonition that Royce study logic as well as a less-known call for a greater appreciation for Secondness and a proper conception of the Will. Of course, the distance of over one hundred years might grant us a clarity they lacked; nonetheless, we should strive to include the forgotten in our community of inquiry.
Peirce Society, 41 3 , Bawden H. Cantrell Michael A. Carlson Charles R.
Peirce Society , 52 2 , Colapietro Vincent M. Peirce Society , 21 4 , DOI: Good James A. Absolutism I. Absolutism II. James William, , The Principles of Psychology , 2 vols. Jarvis Edward A. Leighton J. Mahowald Mary B. What separates him is a willingness to concentrate unabashedly on the issues that Nietzsche took to be central and unique to his concerns, whether or not these issues resonate with the wider concerns of more mainstream analytical interests.
Journal compilation r Blackwell Publishing Ltd. The nihilism of disorientation involves the belief that there are no higher values. Thus a theist who comes to reject belief in God might be left with a complete absence of ultimate values. This is what most of us would recognize as nihilism. The argument is basically this: According to Nietzsche, nihilism involves a pessimistic rejection of the world; it involves the judgement that the world ought not to be. But, if nihilism, as per disorientation, is the view that there are no ultimate values, then there could be no grounds for such pessimism and such a rejection of the world.
It is a striking point; how can one who has lost all values condemn the world?
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That very condemnation presupposes values. I have two worries here. First, systematic philosophers are those that take a core set of doctrines and develop them thoroughly and fully to explain a host of varied phenomena; thereby showing alleged deep connections between said phenomena. In the early works, for instance The Birth of Tragedy, The Untimely Meditations, and the unpublished Philosophy in the Tragic Age of the Greeks, Nietzsche is centrally concerned with the possibility of cultural renewal, a key point being his continual emphasis on the claim that a cultural unity, such as the Greeks achieved, is needed if there is to be a genuine culture.
In the middle period in such works as Human all too Human, Daybreak, and The Gay Science, Nietzsche is engaged primarily with an examination of human nature. It is only in the later works such as Beyond Good and Evil, On the Genealogy of Morals, The Antichrist and Twilight of the Idols, where he diagnoses Judeo-Christianity as the central force that prevents the possibility of a genuine culture, that nihilism comes to the fore.
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Thus, the more plausible story to be told is that the early Nietzsche began with the old romantic concern of how Germany was to develop a genuine, as opposed to a philistine, culture. Slowly he came to realize the depth of the forces that prevented the development of such a culture. By the time of his last works he came to believe that Judeo- Christian morality had left such a deep scar on the modern soul that the inevitable nihilism resulting from this wound negated the possibility of a general elevated culture.
The most that could be hoped for, Nietzsche concludes, is that certain gifted individuals will rise above the inevitable morass of mediocrity that nihilism leaves in its wake.
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Nihilism, and its overcoming, then, is not something that Nietzsche always had in his radar sights. Rather it was the problem he, initially unbeknownst to himself, was always working r The Author The first is that both are overly cognitive. Nihilism in its deepest manifestation is for Nietzsche an affective rather than a cognitive disorder. Where the drives, for various complicated reasons, turn against their own expression Nietzsche characterized this as nihilism.
On this view the more cognitive nihilisms that Reginster characterizes are merely manifestations of this deeper affective nihilism.